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Professor Painter's volume on the corporate, securities, and tax problems of the closely held corporation is lucidly written, well organized,
and carefully simplified. The premise avowedly underlying the book's
structure is that the "problems of business law cannot be broken down
into the neat classical categories of corporate law, tax law, securities
regulations, labor law, antitrust law, and so forth."' The author has
not attempted to be a creator or innovator, but rather has performed
the more modest function of collector and organizer. He is an excellent
craftsman, and he has done well what he wished to do. The issues dealt
with are discussed more in breadth than in depth. It is obviously not
feasible, within a single volume, to refer to all pertinent authorities
or to discuss each detail of the many and varied problems of the closely
held corporation. The main outlines of various relevant areas are explored in the book, and reference is made throughout to the more
exhaustive treatment of such topics in other treatises, such as O'Neal
on closely held corporations, Bittker and Eustice on tax law, Hornstein
and Cavitch on corporation law, and Loss on securities law.
Within his stated purpose, Professor Painter has been most successful. Whether the result will have broad utility and acceptance is another matter. It is hard to determine whether this is a how-to-do-it
handbook, a graceful sort of hornbook, or some new form of text. For
use as an adjunct to a course in business planning or even as a text for
it (if supplemented by a series of problems), this will be a most valuable
volume. As a semi-checklist for the practicing lawyer dealing with a
closely held corporation or as an accountant's guide to the law of the
closely held corporation, it will be quite useful. It is doubtful, however,
whether it will be widely used by attorneys, since for most questions
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it does not approach the depth to which most lawyers will probably
want to pursue their research. The book contains insufficient footnote
and reference material in most areas to enable it to be used effectively
by lawyers as a springboard into the authorities. Lawyers with close
corporation problems would in many cases be forced to resort to one
of the more traditional "compartmentalized" treatises, which might
lead many of them to regard Professor Painter's book as somewhat unnecessary.
The book has the virtues and the limitations inherent in its own
approach. In covering an extremely wide area within a relatively short
compass, it gives the reader an overview of its complex and interesting
subject matter. To evaluate properly and place in perspective the material dealt with, however, the reader should optimally have had a
prior knowledge of corporation, tax, and securities law; if the reader
has a specific practical problem, then the skeletalized treatment of these
various subjects probably will not provide an adequately penetrating
or comprehensive treatment. For example, chapter IX deals with the
first public financing of a closely held corporation and discusses, for
forty-three pages, the advantages of public financing, methods of arranging for it, preparation of the registration statement, possible exemptions, private offerings, intrastate offerings, Regulation A offerings,
and even state blue sky laws. In addition, the author provides in appendix C a detailed time schedule for the preparation, filing, and
making effective of a registration statement under the Securities Act
of 1933, and in appendix D he presents a lengthy example of a closing
memorandum for a public sale through underwriters. The stated reason
for including chapter IX is to describe an alternative method of obtaining liquidity in a closely held corporation. The question is inevitably
raised in the reader's mind, however, whether this purpose could not
have been better accomplished by pointing out that liquidity can be
achieved through an offering of securities and then referring for the
various technical aspects of arranging and consummating such an offer
to an extended and more useful text on securities. Similar questions
might be raised with respect to a number of topics considered in the
book, including the material in the chapters on fringe benefits for
employees of closely held corporations, tax aspects of mergers, consolidations and sale of assets, and corporate reorganizations.
Because the book does not purport to be comprehensive, it is not
adorned with the customary and often pretentious paraphernalia of
scholarship, namely, lengthy footnotes. Yet, in two chapters on maintaining control of the closely held corporation and on deadlock and
dissolution, a much more extensive footnoting is provided. The reader
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receives the impression either that these areas were intended to be the
central core of the book, and were therefore buttressed with a greater
panoply of erudition, or else that they are subjects on which Professor
Painter has previously written, so that the impedimenta of scholarship
were readily includable.
In these sections, as well as in the chapters on squeeze-out of minority
shareholders, distribution and accumulation of corporate earnings,
and buying out of shareholders, Professor Painter wisely concentrates
on the difficulties to which a minority shareholder might be subjected,
the areas of potential dispute and uncertainty, and the need for preplanning and drafting of protective documents either to carry out the
understandings of the parties or to provide for understandings the
parties might not otherwise have adequately made. The treatment of
these particular problems, although not as extensive as that of Professor
O'Neal, is well handled and sufficiently comprehensive.
As an underlying philosophical position, Professor Painter chooses
the view that stockholders of a closely held corporation should have
almost free rein in negotiating desired objectives, as contrasted with the
competing view that certain shareholder relationships are so subject to
abuse that the state should lay down a policy limiting the ability of the
parties to contract in those particular areas. In connection with the
question of whether the beneficiaries of a voting trust can completely
delegate their powers to the voting trustees, for example, he asserts:
"In view of equitable limitations on the ability of a voting trustee to
vote the shares against the interest of the beneficial holders, it seems
better not to set statutory limits on the extent to which shareholders
may delegate their voting powers and permit them to resrict, if they
choose, the voting rights of the trustee on particular matters, with the
assurance that they may receive equitable relief against actions which
'2
are oppressive or otherwise in breach of the trustee's fiduciary duty.
Although I largely agree with Professor Painter's fundamental position, I have great reservations about the wisdom of relying heavily
upon equitable limitations on the discretion of a voting trustee, because courts have too often been reluctant to monitor acts of business
judgment in the absence of provable fraud. I would think that shareholders should give particular consideration to reserving some discretion to themselves on some important policy decisions, such as the
question of merger or sale, by requiring a percentage vote of the stockholders.
After considering the problems indigenous to the closely held cor2 P. 104.
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poration and outlining the difficulties of tailoring it to the rigidities of
the general corporation law, Professor Painter in his last chapter ex-

amines the current close corporation legislation in the United States.
Within very recent years, acts dealing separately with closely held corporations have been adopted in Florida and in South Carolina. Additional provisions of the general corporation law have similarly been
enacted in Delaware, Oregon, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, authorizing, as the close corporation statutes do, separate treatment for
closely held corporations and special status for stockholders' agreements,
with various degrees of permissible deviation from the laws applicable
to general corporations. Professor Painter favors legislative action that
validates negotiated arrangements in closely held corporations, thus
relieving such corporations of the rigidity of the general corporation
structure. He expresses somewhat less enthusiasm for the completely
separate statute, as distinguished from special enabling provisions.
The question of separate acts for closely held corporations is a live
and important current problem that is receiving attention in bar associations and law offices throughout the country. Unhappily, there
is little hard data on the operation of either type of special legislation
for closely held corporations. One wonders what the practical effect of
the separate statute has actually been. A recent recommendation to
repeal the British statute relating to private corporations, coupled with
indications that the Swiss private corporation statute and the Florida
and South Carolina separate private corporation acts are not extensively
used, suggest the need for empirical investigation. Professor Painter
considers some of the objections that have been voiced to special legislation for closely held corporations and finds that "the reasons for
resistance to legislation of this type are not entirely clear." s He reports,
however, that this reluctance is said to be based upon a fear that separate legislation would impede the growth of small corporations and
prevent "their evolution into publicly-held concerns." Also, he records
the suggestion that corporate lawyers may discourage such legislation
in order to prevent possible legislative attacks on the larger corporations, which could occur more easily if large and small corporations
were treated separately. Professor Painter further suggests, as another
possible reason for this reluctance, the difficulty of defining precisely
what is meant by a closely held corporation, but he holds this objection
to be of slight importance.
In view of its difficulty, I feel that the definitional problem deserves a little more attention and comment, even though I believe that
3 P. 442.
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such special legislation should be adopted. Professor Painter points
out that closely held corporations have been defined in several different
ways, either by specifying a given number of persons as determinative
of whether the corporation is closed or public (Delaware and Pennsylvania), or by applying such legislation only to companies whose shares
are "not generally traded in the markets maintained by security dealers
or brokers" (Florida), or are not listed on a national securities exchange
or regularly quoted in the over-the-counter market (New York), or are
not regularly traded in any over-the-counter market (South Carolina).
The Delaware and Pennsylvania statutes also require that all shares
be subject to restriction upon transfer and that the corporation may
not make any public offering of the shares, as that term is defined
in the Securities Act of 1933. All of these definitions are somewhat
vague and uncertain. Tying the status of a corporation, the validity of
its agreements, and the enforceability of negotiated arrangements
among shareholders to such concepts as "regularly quoted" or "generally traded" leaves one in a permanent morass of uncertainty. Tying
the legality of these fundamental understandings to the concept of
"public offering" is even more fearsome to anyone acquainted with
the quagmire of esoteric ambiguity that surrounds private offerings
under the Securities Act of 1933. Consequently, all of the present definitions of a closely held corporation do give a genuine and wellfounded concern to any draftsman of such a statute. The recent Maryland statute eschews all of these number and trading standards in defining a closely held corporation as any corporation that has restricted
transfer of its shares in a manner consonant with the statute. Under all
of the definitions that do not use a numerical limitation, many large
corporations having numerous shareholders may well be treated as
closely held corporations, even though they would not be regarded as
such in ordinary parlance. For example, a multimillion dollar corporation with five hundred stockholders, whose stock is not publicly traded,
may be a closely held corporation under the laws of New York, South
Carolina, and Florida; it could also be considered closely held in Maryland, unless the shares did not carry the requisite restrictions on transfer. By virtue of its exceeding the requisite numbers, however, it
would be denied close corporation treatment under the laws of Delaware and Pennsylvania (as it would have been under the English law,
from which the Delaware numerical test was taken).
In addition to the definitional dilemma, the problem of the termination or disruption of close corporation status merits serious consideration. Suppose a closely held corporation with twenty stockholders,
after careful negotiation, sets up an elaborate series of arrangements-
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for conduct of business, distribution of dividends, employment arrangements, voting of stock, directorships, etc.-that would be valid under
a state's close corporation law but not under its general corporation
law. If the test of a closely held corporation is a numerical one, what
happens if one shareholder dies and leaves his stock to twenty legatees,
thus raising the number of shareholders beyond the numerical limit in
the statute? Do the special provisions remain binding and in effect, or
is the corporation thereupon governed by the general corporation
statute and the arrangements ipso facto terminated? Under a statute
such as that of New York or North Carolina, can a stockholder who
has signed agreements that are enforceable in a closely held corporation
but that would be unenforceable in a public corporation free himself
from the restrictions of these agreements either by effecting prohibited
transfers or by causing other shareholders to create an over-the-counter
market for securities of his corporation? The problems of protecting
closely held corporation arrangements against disruption and of achieving suitable transition arrangements when a corporation ceases to be
closely held-however that is defined-are significant. Such problems
can, of course, be left to the courts for resolution on a case-by-case basis.
But this process would create considerable confusion and probably lead
to frequent cases of injustice. A legislative solution would be preferable
and should be earnestly pursued. The Maryland statute, by buttoning
the close corporation definition solely into stock restrictions, avoids
many of those problems that arise from criteria based upon numbers
or markets. Many persons find it anomalous, however, to conceive of a
corporation as being closely held if it has a thousand shareholders-a
situation that is possible under the Maryland Act. These obstacles can
be successfully overcome; they should not debar close corporation
legislation. They should, however, be recognized and considered in
drafting and enacting such legislation.
Another objection that is strongly urged against special close corporation legislation is that recent state court decisions liberally upholding
stockholders' agreements eliminate the necessity for such legislation.
The argument is pressed that a decision such as Galler v. Galler4 gives
the corporate draftsman enough freedom in effectuating negotiated arrangements between parties, so that close corporation legislation is no
longer necessary.
The Galler case upheld an agreement between two brothers and
their wives providing for a number of arrangements that would be
invalid in a publicly held corporation, including (1) mandatory divi4 32 I1m.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1965).
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dends, (2) an indefinite term for the agreement, (3) an even division of
the four-man board between the two families, and (4) equal salaries
between the two families. The Illinois Supreme Court, in enforcing
the agreement, emphasized that it is now generally recognized that
closely held corporations are sufficiently different from publicly held
corporations to entitle them to special treatment. Although this case
is a great step forward, so many questions remain unanswered that
the bar and the business community should be given the benefit of
the certainty provided by explicit legislative enactments. For example,
in the Galler case, the court upheld an agreement for mandatory dividends out of accumulated earnings above the sum of $500,000 in excess
of stated capital. It is uncertain, however, what other kinds of mandatory dividend requirements will be enforced. It is difficult, for instance,
to predict the result if mandatory dividends were provided without
an obviously large reserve. On the question of the length of time such
an agreement may last, the court said that the lack of a specified term
of years was not fatal since insurance mortality tables indicated the
life expectancy of the parties to the agreement. It is strange to find an
agreement of this sort being tested by the ancient "life or lives in being"
standard common to the rule against perpetuities; it is uncertain how
this court might handle an agreement with a large number of signatories or one that geared its term to the lives of infants, trusts, or corporations. It also leaves open the question of the enforceability of such
an agreement in favor of heirs, successors, and assigns.
The court further stated that the Galler agreement was enforceable
because it had been signed by all of the corporation's stockholders;
this leaves unanswered whether an agreement signed by less than all
of the stockholders is unenforceable, or whether enforceability depends
upon the percentage of stockholders who sign it or upon a relationship
between its particular provisions and the percentage of stockholders
who sign it. Parenthetically, it should be noted that when the Galler
litigation began, ninety-five percent of the stock was held by the two
branches of the Galler family and five percent of the stock was held by
the firm's general manager, not a member of the family. After the
commencement of the litigation, the manager sold his stock to one of
the branches-the defendants, who were seeking to have the agreement
held unenforceable. It is ironic to think that had the defendants not
bought this stock, there would have been, at the time the case was
decided, a stockholder who was not a member of the Galler family-a
fact that, under the language of the court's opinion, might well have
resulted in a decision declaring the agreement invalid, thereby sustaining the defendant's position.
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In addition to the foregoing areas of ambiguity, the Galler decision
leaves in uncertainty such questions as (1) what corporations are sufficiently "close" so that its liberality is applicable, (2) whether directors' action can be totally dispensed with and superseded by direct
shareholder operation, (8) the status of agreements to arbitrate broad
managerial disputes and deadlocks, and (4) whether such an agreement
may be subject to some vague standard of fairness in its operation or
some notion of equity on the part of the party seeking to enforce it.
These kinds of questions raised by the Galler decision and similar
cases indicate the desirability of legislation to provide greater certainty
and reliability in stablizing negotiated arrangements between shareholders of a closely held corporation.
The closely held corporation has often been described as an incorporated partnership; most of Professor Painter's book deals with
attempts that have been made to transform the rigidity of the corporate
form into a format resembling the more flexible type of partnership
arrangement, while still retaining the corporate advantages of perpetual duration and insulation against liability. Perhaps consideration
ought to be given to proceeding from the other end of the spectrum.
It might be easier to achieve the objectives of the participants in a
closely held corporation by restructuring the partnership device instead
of attempting to soften the constraints of a general corporation statute.
The advantages of perpetual duration and limited liability could be
conditioned upon contribution by the partners of the specified capital,
which could be publicized of record. Retention of this capital could
be protected by imposing special limitations on diminution or distribution, analogous to those applicable to corporate capital. Barring any
move in this novel direction, it would seem helpful to press for special
legislation for closely held corporations that would make effective their
special negotiated arrangements with greater certainty than now exists.

